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Abstract: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) can be used
as a tool for encrypting data, creating digital signatures or per-
forming key exchanges. Regarding the encryption procedure,
the schemes currently used are known as hybrid cryptosys-
tems, as they use both symmetric and asymmetric techniques.
Among those hybrid cryptosystems based on ECC, the Ellip-
tic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) is the best
known, and as such it can be found in several cryptographic
standards. In this work, we present an extensive review and
comparison of the versions of ECIES included in documents
from ANSI, IEEE, ISO/IEC, and SECG, highlighting the main
differences between them that may prevent fully interoperable
implementations of ECIES. In addition, a detailed list of the
functions and capabilities needed by ECIES and available in
Java Card is presented, which allows to provide some conclu-
sions about the practical limitations of a Java Card implemen-
tation of ECIES.
Keywords: ECIES, elliptic curves, encryption, hybrid cryp-
tosystem, public key cryptography, Java Card.
1 Introduction
Since the development of public key cryptography by Whit-
field Diffie and Martin Hellman in 1976 [1], several cryp-
tosystems have been proposed. Security and efficiency are the
most important features to be requested to any cryptosystem
and, in general, both characteristics depend on the mathemati-
cal problem on which it is based. The list of problems that are
currently considered computationally infeasible to solve in-
cludes the Integer Factorization Problem (IFP), the Discrete
Logarithm Problem (DLP), and the Elliptic Curve Discrete
Logarithm Problem (ECDLP).
In 1985, Victor Miller [2] and Neal Koblitz [3] indepen-
dently proposed a cryptosystem based on elliptic curves de-
fined over finite fields, whose security relies on the ECDLP
[4]. In comparison with other cryptosystems (e.g. RSA), El-
liptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) uses significantly shorter
keys. The reason for this fact is related to the hardness of
the ECDLP, which is considered by some authors to be more
difficult to solve than the IFP or the DLP [3, 5].
As it is well-known, an elliptic curve, E, over a finite field,
F, can be defined by the Weierstrass equation [6], whose affine
expression is as follows:
E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x + a6, (1)
where a1, a2, a3, a4, a6 ∈ F and ∆ 6= 0, being ∆ the discrim-
inant of the curve [4]. The last condition assures that the curve
has no points with two or more different tangent lines.
In practice, the equation (1) is not used, and the following
simplified equations with affine coordinates are used depend-
ing on the characteristic of the finite field F where the elliptic
curve is defined:
• If the finite field is a prime field, i.e. F = Fp, where
p > 3 is a prime number, the equation defining the (non-
supersingular) elliptic curve becomes:
y2 = x3 + ax + b. (2)
• If the finite field is a binary field, i.e. F = F2m , where
m is an integer number, then the equation of the (non-
supersingular) elliptic curve is:
y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b. (3)
There are other representation systems that use projective
coordinates and homogeneous equations (standard projective
coordinates, Jacobian coordinates, Lopez-Dahab coordinates,
mixed coordinates, etc.) [7, 8]. Point arithmetic in these sys-
tems is more efficient than in the affine system since inver-
sions, the most expensive operations from a computational
point of view with finite field elements, are not necessary in
projective coordinates. Therefore, this is one of the research
areas where more practical developments have been achieved
in recent years [9, 10].
The most extended encryption scheme in ECC is the El-
liptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES). In this
contribution, we present an extensive review and comparison
of the versions of ECIES included in documents from ANSI,
IEEE, ISO/IEC, and SECG, highlighting the main differences
between them that may prevent fully interoperable implemen-
tations of ECIES. In addition, a detailed list of the functions
and capabilities needed by ECIES and available in Java Card
is presented, providing some conclusions about the practical
limitations of a Java Card implementation of ECIES.
This paper is an extended and more complete version of
[11], and is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the most
important cryptosystems based on elliptic curves. Section 3
presents the functional design of ECIES. Section 4 provides
a comparison of the different versions of ECIES included in
the ANSI X9.63, IEEE 1363a, ISO/IEC 18033-2, and SEC 1
documents. Section 5 includes the specific functions allowed
in those standards. In Section 6 we describe the functions and
capabilities available in the latest versions of Java Card (2.2,
2.2.1, 2.2.2, and 3.0) that are necessary in order to implement
ECIES in a smart card. Finally, we will summarize the most
important findings and conclusions in Section 7.
2 Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
2.1 Early Cryptosystems
The first encryption schemes based on elliptic curves were the
equivalent versions of the Massey-Omura [12] and ElGamal
[13] cryptosystems, both presented by Koblitz in 1985 (and
published in 1987) [3], and the Menezes-Vanstone cryptosys-
tem [14].
One of the main disadvantages of the Massey-Omura and
ElGamal versions adapted for elliptic curves is that plain-
texts and encrypted messages must be represented as points
of an elliptic curve E. This disadvantage, when using elliptic
curves whose order #E is a high value, produces a limita-
tion which is more theoretical than practical. However, the re-
quirement to build tables stating the relationship between ev-
ery possible message and its related elliptic curve point limits
the usefulness of these cryptosystems to closed environments
(enterprises, small groups, etc.) where all possible messages
are previously established.
The Menezes-Vanstone cryptosystem for elliptic curves
was designed precisely to overcome this limitation, as instead
of matching each message with a point on the curve E, it
represents the plaintexts as ordered pairs of F∗ × F∗, where
F∗ = F \ {0} and those pairs do not necessarily have to rep-
resent the coordinates of an elliptic curve point. Using this
cryptosystem, it is possible to divide any plaintext in blocks,
where each block could be easily encoded as an ordered pair.
The disadvantage of this procedure is that, instead of trans-
forming each clear message into a single point of the curve
(where the binary representation of every point of the curve
has the same length), the size of the encrypted message de-
pends directly on the length of the plaintext.
In the Menezes-Vanstone cryptosystem, the expansion fac-
tor (i.e. the ratio between the size of the cryptogram and
the length of the clear message) is 2, since a plaintext x =
(x1, x2), consisting of two elements of the finite field F∗, pro-
duces the cryptogram (Y0, y1, y2), where y1, y2 ∈ F and Y ∗0
is an elliptic curve point consisting in two coordinates that
belong to the finite field, so in summary the total number of
finite elements to be transmitted is 4. When using point com-
pression in order to decrease the length of the information to
be transmitted (i.e. only the first coordinate of the point is
sent along with an additional byte that includes the necessary
data for recovering the whole point), the expansion factor is
reduced to approximately 1.5.
In comparison, the expansion factor of the variants of the
Massey-Omura and ElGamal cryptosystems is 2, as the clear
message is considered to be a point of the curve and, in each
of those cryptosystems, it is necessary to transmit 2 elliptic
curve points. In practice, a high value for the expansion fac-
tor implies that the encryption of the information generates
cryptograms much larger than those produced when using a
symmetric key algorithm like AES.
Another disadvantage resulting from the design of the
Menezes-Vanstone cryptosystem is that it is necessary to
make operations with the points of the elliptic curve in each
encryption process. As depending on the plaintext length it
is necessary to divide the clear message in multiple segments
and perform asymmetric encryption operations with each of
those segments, the performance of the Menezes-Vanstone
scheme degrades much faster than with a symmetric encryp-
tion algorithm when the number of segments increases.
In addition to the previously mentioned practical disad-
vantages, Klaus Kiefer showed in 1998 that, under certain
conditions, this cryptosystem is insecure [16]. Kiefer also
demonstrated that, contrary to the terms of its specification,
the Menezes-Vanstone cryptosystem cannot be considered a
probabilistic encryption algorithm.
2.2 Hybrid Cryptosystems
Due to the reasons mentioned in the previous section, over
the years the academic community abandoned the study of
the three initial cryptosystems based on elliptic curves. As
an illustrative example, while in the first edition of the work
by Douglas Stinson [17] both the ElGamal and the Menezes-
Vanstone cryptosystems for elliptic curves were included, in
the second and third editions these schemes were replaced by
ECIES. Even in one of the latest books about this subject,
co-authored by Alfred Menezes and Scott Vanstone [8], the
Menezes-Vanstone scheme is not included.
However, the discovery of the limitations of these early
cryptosystems did not imply the abandonment of the search
for a practical and secure elliptic curve cryptosystem, as it
only caused a change of direction, occupying now the spot-
light the hybrid encryption schemes, which bring the best
characteristics of both symmetric and asymmetric cryptog-
raphy. The most important hybrid schemes that use ellip-
tic curves are ECIES, PSEC (Provably Secure Elliptic Curve
encryption scheme) [18, 19], and ACE (Advanced Crypto-
graphic Engine) [19, 20].
Of the three schemes, ECIES is available in a greater
number of standards (ANSI X9.63 [21], IEEE 1363rd [22],
ISO/IEC 18033-2 [23], and SECG SEC 1 [24]). PSEC can
be found in ISO/IEC 18033-2 [23], IETF RFC 4051 [25], and
the set of algorithms selected for the NESSIE (New European
Schemes for Signatures, Integrity and Encryption) project
[26, 27], while ACE is available in ISO/IEC 18033-2 [23],
and the final selection of NESSIE [26, 27].
After reviewing the three schemes, the main differences
that can be identified are the following:
• In both PSEC and ECIES, the recipient’s public key is a
point on the elliptic curve, V = v ·G, where v is the re-
cipient’s private key, and G is the generator of the group
of points of the cyclic subgroup used in the computa-
tions, while in the ACE scheme the public key consists
of four elliptic curve points, so V = (W,X, Y, Z).
• PSEC uses twice a key derivation function in order to
obtain a pair of MAC and symmetric encryption keys,
whilst ACE and ECIES use such a function only once.
• ECIES and ACE use the first coordinate of a point of the
curve generated during the calculations (instead of both
coordinates) as an input parameter to the key derivation
function previously mentioned, while PSEC requires to
use both coordinates.
• PSEC is the only scheme that uses the XOR function dur-
ing the key generation process (regardless of its usage as
a symmetric encryption function).
• Cryptograms in ECIES consist of three elements (the
sender’s ephemeral public key, the encrypted message,
and a MAC code), while cryptograms in PSEC include
one additional element, a binary string, and in ACE the
cryptograms include two additional elliptic curve points.
Making a comparison of the three schemes ECIES offers
the best-balanced set of features, providing a secure and flex-
ible solution for the encryption of data.
3 Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryp-
tion Scheme (ECIES)
3.1 ECIES Versions
In 1997, Mihir Bellare and Philip Rogaway [28] presented
the Discrete Logarithm Augmented Encryption Scheme
(DLAES), which was subsequently improved by the same au-
thors and Michel Abdalla, being first renamed as the Diffie-
Hellman Augmented Encryption Scheme (DHAES) in 1998
[29] and later as the Diffie-Hellman Integrated Encryption
Scheme (DHIES) in 2001 [30], in order to avoid confu-
sions with the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). DHIES
represents an enhanced version of the ElGamal encryption
scheme, using elliptic curves in an integrated scheme which
includes public key operations, symmetric encryption algo-
rithms, MAC codes, and hash computations. Because of the
integration of different functions, DHIES is secure against
chosen ciphertext attacks without having to increase the num-
ber of operations or the key length [30].
Figure 1 presents the version of DHIES included in [30],
where M represents the clear message, g is a generator of
a multiplicative cyclic group G, gv and v are the recipient’s
public and private keys, respectively, and gu and u are the
sender’s ephemeral public and private keys, respectively. We
denote by E the symmetric encryption algorithm, while T is
the MAC code generation function, andH is the hash function.
DHIES was evaluated by ANSI and included with some
modifications in the ANSI X9.63 standard [21] in 2001. Inde-
pendently, IEEE had released in 2000 the IEEE 1363 standard
[31], so when ANSI X9.63 was made public, the group of ex-
perts of IEEE reviewed both DHIES and the version proposed
by ANSI, and included a modified version in the amendment
IEEE 1363a [22] released in 2004.
During those years, another ISO/IEC expert group was col-
laborating in the creation of the set of standards to be known
as the 18033 family, so they took as starting point all the previ-
ous versions of ECIES and the existing studies about its secu-
rity, and produced another slightly different version of ECIES,
which was included in the ISO/IEC 18033-2 standard [23] in
2006.
Before finishing this compilation of ECIES versions, it is
necessary to point out the Standards for Efficient Cryptog-
raphy Group (SECG), an industry consortium, that included
ECIES in the SEC 1 document [24] released in 2000 (version
1.0) and updated in 2009 (version 2.0).
In order to avoid misunderstandings, all these versions of
the encryption scheme receive along this contribution the
generic name of ECIES, even though the versions are not
identical.
3.2 ECIES Functional Components
As it name indicates, ECIES is an integrated encryption
scheme that uses the following functions:
• Key Agreement (KA): Function used by two parties for
the creation of a shared secret.
• Key Derivation (KDF): Mechanism that produces a set of
keys from keying material and some optional parameters.
• Hash (HASH): Digest function.
• Encryption (ENC): Symmetric encryption algorithm.
• Message Authentication Code (MAC): Information used
to authenticate a message.
After comparing the ECIES versions defined by ANSI,
IEEE, ISO/IEC, and SECG, two main groups of differences
are clearly detectable:
• Functionality: Implementation details, usage of optional
elements, binary representation conventions, etc.
• Allowed functions: Specific functions (HASH, ENC,
etc.) allowed in each standard.
4 ECIES Functionality Comparison
In this section, we analyse in pairs the main differences (in
terms of functionality) among the different standard imple-
mentations of ECIES.
4.1 DHIES and ANSI X9.63
The following list presents the most relevant differences be-
tween the original DHIES specification [30] and the version
implemented in the ANSI X9.63 standard [21].
• DHIES does not allow arbitrary parameters in neither the
KDF nor the MAC function, whilst X9.63 does allow pa-
rameters in both functions.
• DHIES uses a HASH function to produce the MAC and
ENC keys. In comparison, ANSI X9.63 uses a KDF
construction where the data is processed during several
rounds.
Figure 1: DHIES functional diagram.
• DHIES interprets the leftmost bits of the output of the
KDF function as the MAC key, and the rightmost bits as
the ENC key. In ANSI X9.63, the order is precisely the
opposite.
• ANSI X9.63 only allows to use the XOR function as the
symmetric encryption cipher. In comparison, DHIES of-
fers to use either a stream or a block cipher, leaving open
the option of the specific cipher to use.
4.2 ANSI X9.63 and IEEE 1363a
The list included hereafter reflects the main differences be-
tween the ECIES implementations included in the ANSI
X9.63 [21] and IEEE 1363a [22] standards.
• ANSI X9.63 allows to use an arbitrary parameter as an
input to the KDF function, but does not mention the con-
tent of that optional parameter. In comparison, the so-
called DHAES mode in IEEE 1363a mandates to use the
binary representation of the sender’s public key as an in-
put parameter.
• IEEE 1363a interprets the leftmost bits of the output of
the KDF function as the MAC key, and the rightmost bits
as the ENC key when using a stream cipher, and the op-
posite when using a block cipher. In comparison, ANSI
X9.63 always interprets the ouput as kENC ||kMAC .
4.3 IEEE 1363a and ISO/IEC 18033-2
The following list presents the main differences between the
IEEE 1363a [22] and ISO/IEC 18033-2 [23] standards.
• ISO/IEC 18033-2 does not allow parameters in the KDF
function, whereas IEEE 1363a allows the usage of pa-
rameters in that function.
• IEEE 1363a includes the option to use either bit or byte
strings, whilst ISO/IEC 18033-2 mandates the usage of
byte strings.
• IEEE 1363a suggests to use always the same set of pa-
rameters and functions for a given public key. In com-
parison, ISO/IEC 18033-2 mandates not to change un-
der any circumstance those parameters for the same re-
ceiver’s public key.
• IEEE 1363a states that the minimum key length must be
160 bits. In contrast, ISO/IEC 18033-2 does not mention
any minimum key length.
It is worth mentioning that there were more differences
between IEEE 1363a and the first draft version of ISO/IEC
18033-2 [19]. These differences were removed in the final
version of the document in order to obtain a higher level
of compliance with previous standards and implementations.
Those differences were the following:
• In the draft version of ISO/IEC 18033-2, it was manda-
tory to use the ephemeral public key of the sender as an
input for the KDF function, but in the final version this
feature is optional. In comparison, IEEE 1363a includes
an option (the non-DHAES mode) that does not use that
public key.
• The draft version of ISO/IEC 18033-2 stated that it was
necessary to include as an input for the MAC funcion the
length of the tag string that is attached to the encrypted
message before the MAC computation takes place. In the
final version of the standard, two modes were included
(DEM2 and DEM3) not using this tag length. In IEEE
1363a, again the non-DHAES mode offers the option of
not including this length.
• ISO/IEC 18033-2 presents the option of using the XOR
function as a stream cipher as part of the DEM3 mode,
although this possibility was clearly forbidden in the ini-
tial draft version. IEEE 1363a allows both block ciphers
and stream ciphers.
4.4 ISO/IEC 18033-2 and SECG SEC 1
The following list provides the main differences between the
ECIES implementations included in the ISO/IEC 18033-2
standard [23] and the SEC 1 document [24].
• ISO/IEC 18033-2 does not allow input parameters in the
KDF function, whilst SEC 1 allows to include this ad-
ditional information, even though in the test vectors in-
cluded in the GEC 2 document [32] no additional param-
eters have been used.
• SEC 1 does not explicitly include the sender’s ephemeral
public key in the KDF computation. However, it men-
tions that the public key could be one of the elements
used as input parameters in that function.
• ISO/IEC 18033-2 does not mention minimum key
lengths, whereas SEC 1 states that the selection of the
field must be guided by the following requirements:
Fp: dlog2 pe ∈ {192, 224, 256, 384, 521}.
F2m : m ∈ {163, 233, 239, 283, 409, 571}.
5 Allowed Functions Comparison
This section presents the comparison of allowed KA, KDF,
HASH, ENC, and MAC functions included in the aforemen-
tioned standards.
Table 1 shows the different KA functions allowed in
ECIES. Here DH denotes the Diffie-Hellman key agreement
function, whilst DHC is the Diffie-Hellman function using the
cofactor of the elliptic curve.
X9.63 1363a 18033-2 SEC 1
DH DH DH DH
DHC DHC DHC DHC
Table 1: KA functions.
The KDF functions considered in ECIES are presented in
Table 2, where X9.63-KDF is the KDF function defined in the
ANSI X9.63 standard, KDF1 and KDF2 are functions defined
by the ISO/IEC 18033-2 document, and NIST-800-56 is the
KDF concatenacion function specified in [33].
X9.63 1363a 18033-2 SEC 1
X9.63-KDF X9.63-KDF KDF1 X9.63-KDF
KDF2 NIST-800-56
Table 2: KDF functions.
Table 3 presents the HASH functions used in ECIES. SHA-
1 is the well-known digest function included in [34]; SHA-2
represents the family composed by SHA-256, SHA-384, and
SHA-512 [34]; SHA-2∗ is the SHA-2 family with the addi-
tion of the SHA-224 hash algorithm [34]; RIPEMD is the set
of hash algorithms defined in [35]; and WHIRLPOOL is the
function defined in [36].
The symmetric ciphers considered in ECIES are shown in
Tables 4 and 5, where XOR⊥ represents the ISO/IEC 18033-2
method that uses the XOR function together with a KDF func-
tion in order to derive a XOR key of variable length; TDES is
X9.63 1363a 18033-2 SEC 1
SHA-1 SHA-1 SHA-1 SHA-1
SHA-224 SHA-256 SHA-256 SHA-224
SHA-256 SHA-384 SHA-384 SHA-256
SHA-384 SHA-512 SHA-512 SHA-384
SHA-512 RIPEMD-160 RIPEMD-128 SHA-512
RIPEMD-160
WHIRLPOOL
Table 3: HASH functions.
the Triple DES algorithm in CBC mode [37]; AES represents
the Advanced Encryption Standard family, that is, AES-128,
AES-192, and AES-256; and MISTY1, CAST-128, Camellia,
and SEED are the algorithms specified in [38], [39], [40], and
[41], respectively.
ANSI X9.63 IEEE 1363a
XOR XOR
TDES/CBC/PKCS5
AES/CBC/PKCS5
Table 4: ENC functions (I).
ISO/IEC 18033-2 SECG SEC 1
XOR XOR
XOR⊥ TDES/CBC
TDES/CBC/PKCS5 AES/CBC
AES/CBC/PKCS5 AES/CTR
MISTY1/CBC/PKCS5
CAST-128/CBC/PKCS5
Camellia/CBC/PKCS5
SEED/CBC/PKCS5
Table 5: ENC functions (II).
Tables 6 and 7 show the allowed MAC functions. HMAC-
SHA-1 and HMAC-RIPEMD are defined in [42]; HMAC-
SHA-2 represents the family of HMAC algorithms, i.e.,
HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512,
described in [43]; HMAC-SHA-2∗ is the same as HMAC-
SHA-2 with the addition of the HMAC-SHA-224 function
[43]; and CMAC-AES is the set of AES-related HMAC
functions, that is, CMAC-AES-128, CMAC-AES-192, and
CMAC-AES-256, included in [44].
Finally, Table 8 presents all the cryptographic functions and
algorithms allowed simultaneously in the four standard ver-
sions of ECIES cited along this document.
6 ECIES in Java Card
Smart cards are considered tamper-resistant, portable storage
devices that can enhance the security of different systems and
procedures (e.g. client authentication [45]). Java Card is a
framework for the programming and execution of applications
in smart cards developed by Sun with the support from several
leading smart card providers.
ANSI X9.63 IEEE 1363a
H-SHA-1 H-SHA-1
H-SHA-224 H-SHA-256
H-SHA-256 H-SHA-384
H-SHA-384 H-SHA-512
H-SHA-512 H-RIPEMD-160
Table 6: MAC functions (I).
ISO/IEC 18033-2 SECG SEC 1
H-SHA-1 H-SHA-1-80/160
H-SHA-256 H-SHA-224-112/224
H-SHA-384 H-SHA-256-128/256
H-SHA-512 H-SHA-384-192/384
H-RIPEMD-128 H-SHA-512-256/512
H-RIPEMD-160 CMAC-AES-128/192/256
H-WHIRLPOOL
Table 7: MAC functions (II).
Even though Java Card version 2.1 included some crypto-
graphic capabilities, the support for ECC was not included
until version 2.2, so this section is focused in the comparison
of the functionality needed by ECIES and available in Java
Card versions 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.2, and 3.0.
6.1 Java Card 2.2 and 2.2.1
Java Card 2.2 implements the following functionality related
to ECIES:
• HASH function: SHA-1.
• KA function: DH and DHC, with the peculiarity that,
instead of obtaining the first coordinate of the product
of the sender’s ephemeral private key and the recipient’s
public key, these functions provide the SHA-1 output of
that result.
• ENC function: AES with key lengths of 128, 192, and
256 bits in CBC and ECB modes, both without padding.
• ECC key length: 113, 131, 163, and 193 bits in binary
fields, and 112, 128, 160, and 192 bits in prime fields.
Java Card 2.2.1 did not present any change in the list of
functions and available key lengths related to ECIES.
6.2 Java Card 2.2.2
The main novelties in Java Card 2.2.2 were the HMAC and
SHA-2 group of functions. The complete list of functions and
HASH KA KDF ENC MAC
SHA-1 DH KDF2 XOR HMAC-SHA-1
SHA-256 DHC HMAC-SHA-256
SHA-384 HMAC-SHA-384
SHA-512 HMAC-SHA-512
Table 8: Common functions allowed in the standards.
key lengths related to ECIES in this version of Java Card is
the following:
• HASH function: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and
SHA-512.
• KA function: DH and DHC, with the peculiarity already
present in Java Card 2.2 and 2.2.1.
• ENC function: AES with key length 128, 192, and 256
bits in CBC and ECB mode, both without padding.
• MAC function: HMAC-SHA-1-64, HMAC-SHA-256-
64, HMAC-SHA-384-128, and HMAC-SHA-512-128.
• ECC key length: 113, 131, 163, and 193 bits in binary
fields, and 112, 128, 160, and 192 bits in prime fields.
6.3 Java Card 3.0
Java Card 3.0 has extended the number of padding modes in
the ENC function, as well as the possible key lengths available
in the prime fields Fp. The complete list of Java Card 3.0
functionalities related to ECIES is the following:
• HASH function: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and
SHA-512.
• KA function: DH and DHC, with the modes included in
the previous versions and also a new mode that provides
directly the product of the sender’s ephemeral private key
and the recipient’s public key.
• ENC function: AES with key lengths of 128, 192, and
256 bits in CBC and ECB modes, both either without
padding or with PKCS#5 padding.
• ECC key length: 113, 131, 163, and 193 bits in binary
fields, and 112, 128, 160, 192, 224, 256, and 384 bits in
prime fields.
• MAC function: HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512.
6.4 Java Card Summary
Tables 9 and 10 show a summary of the information presented
in the previous sections, where DHC y DH are the Diffie-
Hellman functions with and without cofactor, respectively,
and DHC∗ y DH∗ are the same functions with the particularity
explained in §6.1.
Java Card 2.2 Java Card 2.2.1
HASH SHA-1 SHA-1
KA
DH∗ DH∗
DHC∗ DHC∗
ENC
DES DES
TDES TDES
AES-128 AES-128
MAC
Fp 112,128,160,192 112,128,160,192
F2m 113,131,163,193 113,131,163,193
Table 9: ECC functionality in Java Card (I).
Java Card 2.2.2 Java Card 3.0
HASH
SHA-1 SHA-1
SHA-256 SHA-224
SHA-384 SHA-256
SHA-512 SHA-384
SHA-512
KA
DH∗ DH∗
DHC∗ DHC∗
DH
DHC
ENC
DES DES
TDES TDES
AES-128 AES-128
AES-192
AES-256
MAC
HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-256 HMAC-SHA-256
HMAC-SHA-384 HMAC-SHA-384
HMAC-SHA-512 HMAC-SHA-512
Fp
112,128,160,192 112,128,160,192,
224,256,384
F2m 113,131,163,193 113,131,163,193
Table 10: ECC functionality in Java Card (II).
7 Conclusions
After reviewing the different versions of ECIES included in
the standards, it is possible to obtain the following conclu-
sions:
1. ECIES is the best known encryption scheme based on el-
liptic curves, and it is included in ANSI X9.63, IEEE
1363a, ISO/IEC 18033-2, and SECG SEC 1. Even
though those versions are ultimately based on the DHIES
scheme, there are important differences regarding the
functionality and the specific functions allowed by each
standard.
2. All the standards allow to use the XOR function as the
symmetric encryption algorithm. However, in order to
avoid security problems when using this function, the
message length should have a fixed value, which lim-
its dramatically the practicality of the encryption scheme
[19]. The best solution, given these circumstances, con-
sists in using a symmetric block cipher instead of the
XOR function.
3. Besides, the implementation in devices such as Java
Cards faces another important problem: the limitation in
the functions available to the developer in the program-
ming interface.
4. The direct consequence of the previous comments is that,
when implementing ECIES, the first step should be to
evaluate the capabilities provided by the final platform
and, from that point, decide which version of ECIES to
implement. Regarding this point, even though the newer
versions (e.g. ISO/IEC 18033-2 and SEC 1) may not be
fully compatible with legacy devices, they provide ac-
cess to the most recent and secure functions (e.g. SHA-
2, AES, etc.), so it should be recommended to use one of
these versions.
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